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	 Abstract: The boundary problem holds that, whatever the theory of 
democratic legitimacy, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be 
considered met by it. Many contemporary attempts to solve the boundary 
problem can be understood as falling into two categories: functional demos 
views and global demos views. This article argues against both views. Func-
tional demos views exacerbate the legitimacy puzzle posed by the boundary 
problem, while a global democracy cannot be held democratically account-
able by its citizens. In the place of global demos and functional demos views, 
we ought to examine the democratic legitimacy of polities in light of the 
standards of pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy is a non-ideal concep-
tion of democracy that recognizes democratic procedures to be historically 
grounded, non-ideal, and problem-oriented.
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The boundary problem is a classic issue in democratic theory. It holds 
that, whatever the theory of legitimacy that we believe our preferred 
democratic decision procedure should meet, the initial act of constitut-
ing the demos can never be met by it (Miller 2009; Whelan 1983). The 
problem is that the constitution of the demos is itself a political act with 
wide-ranging effects. Ordinarily, political acts with wide-ranging effects 
are subject to a democratic legitimacy demand. So we would need a demo-
cratic procedure to legitimate the decision over who should be included 
in the demos—a demos-constituting procedure, if you will.1 But a demos-
constituting procedure cannot take place without first determining who 
ought to participate in that procedure. Given that this prior procedure 
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(the procedure constituting who will participate in the demos-constitut-
ing procedure) is also political, with wide-ranging effects, it too needs to 
be legitimated by a procedure of its own ad infinitum. There is a problem 
of regression.
Some contemporary political theorists hold that the boundary prob-
lem can be solved by changing our conception of the democratic people 
from a relatively fixed and permanent body of persons grouped territori-
ally and living under the laws of a single, unitary state to a demos includ-
ing all persons bearing a certain “functional”2 relationship to the decision 
that is to be taken, for instance being “affected” by that decision (e.g., 
Goodin 2007) or being “subject to coercion” by it (e.g., Abizadeh 2008). 
If there is an independent standard that allows one to calculate the ap-
propriate membership of a putative demos, then the boundary problem 
collapses—which persons to include and which persons to exclude from 
a democratic body, such views argue, can be objectively determined and 
therefore need not be subject to a democratic procedure to be legitimate. 
Let us call such sorts of “solutions” functional demos views.
Other theorists think that the boundary problem must be solved 
by recourse to a global democracy (e.g., Agné 2010; Arrhenius 2005: 22; 
Verschoor 2018: 15; cf. Nili 2017; Schaffer 2012). If all should participate 
equally in a global democratic process, then the question of which per-
sons a democratic community includes, and which it excludes, is moot. 
All persons ought to be included in the global demos. The boundary prob-
lem again disappears. Let us call these sorts of solutions to the boundary 
problem global demos views.
This article criticizes both functional demos and global demos views, 
defending instead a conception of democracy I call pluralist democracy. 
This conception sees the normative value of democratic governance as 
historically grounded and non-ideal. Pluralist democrats demanded—and 
eventually won—participation rights in autocratic polities, overturning 
the specific wrong of their being governed autocratically. The question of 
the democratic legitimacy of a polity is never asked in a vacuum. This is 
why it is mistaken to try to imagine an ideally democratic state, as func-
tional and global demos views advocate. In contrast, pluralist democracy 
recognizes that all who are subject to a polity ought to have an equal 
stake in authorizing the laws to which they are subjected.
Part 1 of this article opens by considering whether functional demos 
views solve the boundary problem as they purport to. This is an “imma-
nent critique” in the tradition of German Ideologiekritik, in the sense that it 
interrogates and criticizes functional demos views on their own grounds 
of success, drawing the relevant normative standards internally.3 I find 
that, far from solving the legitimacy puzzle presented in the boundary 
Theuns � Pluralist Democracy and Non-Ideal Democratic Legitimacy 25
problem, functional demos views exacerbate it. The question of who 
meets a functional membership standard cannot be solved in an objec-
tive fashion. All standards would need to be transposed into policy, and 
the technocratic running of such policies is unavoidably political. Con-
sequently, democratic legitimacy concerns over the constitution of the 
demos are, in functional demos views, merely postponed. Let us call this 
objection the tenacious membership objection. If the tenacious membership 
objection is convincing, and if we take the boundary problem seriously, 
we should abandon functional demos views.
Part 2 of this article recalls the argument of Sarah Song that a func-
tional membership standard of membership in a democratic community 
would mean that every political decision has a largely unique set of per-
sons that ought to be included in the democratic process. Each individual 
would not be part of one demos, but of many overlapping demoi—meet-
ing the appropriate functional standard with a different set of people de-
pending on the issue at stake—a problem partly anticipated by Frederick 
Whelan (1983). I call this characteristic of democratic systems with func-
tionally defined memberships their “floating” quality. While Song recog-
nized this dilemma, she did not analyze precisely what was wrong with 
floating demoi from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. I expand 
upon her argument to fill in this gap: floating demoi make self-rule—vital 
for democratic conceptions of law-making—impossible. Floating demoi 
result in floating jurisdictions and the piecemeal enforcement of demo-
cratic rule. In short, political communities whose memberships are func-
tionally defined cannot be democratically governed.
In Part 3, I consider the extent to which arguments for a global de-
mocracy with a global demos solve the boundary problem. Theorists who 
defend global demos views may do so for a variety of reasons; a global 
demos may be postulated specifically to solve the boundary problem 
(e.g., Agné 2010; Verschoor 2018: 15), or it may be considered the only de-
fensible functionally defined demos on a particular functional standard. 
(Particularly, the “all-affected-interests” standard is sometimes argued to 
require a global demos—for example in Goodin 2007.)4 Part 3 of this ar-
ticle argues that while global demos views are successful in solving the 
apparent normative quandary posed by the boundary problem, they do 
so at a high cost. Global democracy cannot be procedurally democratic 
because it cannot be held democratically accountable by its citizenry.
Finally, in Part 4 of this article I sketch out a conception of democ-
racy I call pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy is a non-ideal conception 
of democracy that recognizes democratic procedures to be historically 
grounded and problem-oriented. Replacing polities’ nondemocratic prac-
tices with democratic governance legitimated those polities’ political 
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authority. Given their problem-oriented character, it does not make sense 
to hold democratic procedures to ideal-theoretical standards of legitimacy. 
In other words, the facts that the boundary problem lays out are correct 
but are not an obstacle to democratic legitimacy. In contrast to the func-
tional demos and global demos views, however, considering the legitimacy 
of the constitution of a democratic community from this perspective does 
have the crucial advantage of affirming a vision of democracy that makes a 
constituted polity’s internal democratic governance possible.
Functional Attempts at Solving the Boundary Problem
Recently, there have been several new and innovative approaches to tack-
ling the boundary problem (e.g., Goodin 2007; Miller 2009; Agné 2010; 
Song 2012; Verschoor 2018). Most of these attempts have focused on dis-
cerning a rival, defensible standard for membership to simply accepting 
the status quo, which is argued to be irrelevant from a moral point of 
view. Rival standards often relate putative members of a demos to the po-
litical decision that is to be made “functionally”; if a would-be member’s 
relation to the decision is considered sufficiently weighty on a stipulated 
metric, then their participation in that procedure is justified. I label these 
attempts “functional membership standards” (FMS), as they focus on the 
functional needs and interests of persons as the locus for legitimating 
grounds for membership, rather than on their juridical status (a legal 
standard) or on the place where they are settled (a territorial standard).
One FMS, most fully worked out by Robert Goodin (2007) but dis-
cussed also by Robert Dahl (1989), Shapiro (1999), and others, claims that 
a demos ought to be composed of all whose interests are affected by the 
decisions that the demos is to take—the all-affected-interests standard 
(Dahl 1989: 93–95; Goodin 2007; Shapiro 1999: 37). Goodin runs into the 
problem that it is difficult to be analytically precise about what it is to be 
“interested,” particularly a priori, since interests are interdependent. Is it 
enough, for instance, that a decision “possibly” affects a person, or must 
it be “likely” to affect them, or “definitely” affect them for them to be 
included in the demos that is to take that decision? Regardless of this dif-
ficulty, that one’s interests are affected seems a plausible and reasonable 
functional standard for democratic inclusion at first blush.5
Another FMS was recently defended by Arash Abizadeh (2008). He 
proposed that all those subject to coercion ought to be included in any demo-
cratic decision procedure, rather than all those who happen to be citizens 
of a preexisting democratic state. To secure this conclusion, Abizadeh lays 
out the lines of argument familiar from Whelan’s boundary problem. 
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According to Abizadeh, the boundary problem creates a “legitimacy gap” 
in the constitution of the demos only if we assume that demoi are in 
principle “bounded”—relatively fixed in membership and territorially 
limited. But by theorizing the “unbounded demos,” where the right to 
participate in an election is based on the functional question of whether 
one is coerced by the state apparatus, the boundary problem is avoided.
The unbounded demos thesis has far-reaching implications: “[T]he 
drawing and control of boundaries must ultimately be justified to those 
whom the boundaries are meant to define as non-members” as well as to 
members (2008: 44).6 In his article, Abizadeh applies this principle to bor-
der regimes, but his proposed metric, which he calls the “demos qua reg-
ulative principle,” is also more generally a standard on which to measure 
the degree to which existing democracies and their political institutions 
can be considered (democratically) legitimate.
While Abizadeh is usefully explicit about why his functional mem-
bership standard is democratically superior to bounded territorial states 
(i.e., that it supposedly solves the boundary problem), the architecture of 
the argument that functional standards “solve” the boundary problem 
can be generalized. The boundary problem argues that the constitution 
of a demos ought—but ordinarily cannot—be democratically legitimated, 
whereas functional demos views hold that the constitution of a demos 
need not be legitimated by a procedure; it is legitimate for all persons 
bearing a certain functional relationship to a given law or policy to have 
a stake in the demos’ creation.
The Tenacious Membership Problem
Abizadeh’s unbounded demos thesis, and its FMS correlates, do not solve 
the boundary problem. The boundary problem suggests that the ques-
tion of to whom justification is owed is itself a political question—one 
that ought but cannot (hence the problem) be itself subject to legitimacy 
procedures. But FMS do not solve this paradox. Recall, FMS posit a func-
tional standard that is supposed to resolve the foundational question of 
which persons ought to be included in a democratic body. But even if, for 
the sake of argument, we accept a particular standard as being correct, 
there is still the question of the administration of this policy and the ad-
judication of hard cases. The forums in which these questions are to be 
deliberated and the institutions that may execute subsequent policy can-
not arise from nothing. Abizadeh writes: “[O]f course, political decisions 
about which options are valuable to whom cannot legitimately proceed 
without the participatory input of the persons in question” (2008: 55). But 
deciding which persons those are is itself a membership issue that cannot be 
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settled democratically because of the very same regressive structure of 
argumentation that fuels the boundary problem.
In fact, any top-down resolution of the question of who ought to partic-
ipate in whatever preferred democratic procedure deciding which persons 
adequately meet a functional standard, or indeed even setting the agenda 
on such an issue, requires an agent to initiate and an unavoidably politi-
cal decision on who participates in that initiation, in setting that agenda, 
and in deciding who is to decide which persons are relevantly affected by 
a given law or policy and why. Any bureaucratic organization deciding 
such matters will itself suffer from the same supposed legitimacy deficit 
that the boundary problem determines a constituted demos has.7 This is 
the tenacious membership problem, and it has application to all functional 
standards, since any FMS raises the question of who must decide which 
putative members meet the relevant standard, and for what reason. An or-
ganization with this decision-making capacity cannot itself be legitimated 
on the preferred standard of democratic legitimacy, since such an organi-
zation cannot itself be generated and justified by the extent to which its 
agents meet a functional standard (which would raise a new problem of 
regression), nor can it be chosen by a democratic procedure (which would 
raise the familiar regression from the original boundary problem).
Functional Standards = Floating Demoi
If the legitimacy of a democratic decision-making procedure is indeed 
dependent on all those subject to coercion participating in the procedure 
(or all those with affected interests, or any similar FMS), then the un-
bounded demos thesis has wide implications. Indeed, there is no reason 
to suppose that the appropriate demos for any two legal or policy ques-
tions will ever be the same. Song puts it this way:
What the affected interests and coercion principles require is different 
demoi for different decisions. Who will be affected or coerced by any 
single decision will vary from decision to decision, and as a result, demo-
cratic boundaries are not fixed but constantly changing . . . A new demos 
is called into being for every new decision. (Song 2012: 41)
Song calls this the “problem of stability,” and her concern was preempted 
by Whelan and Dahl, who, more than any others, popularized interest in 
and discussion of the boundary problem. Both formulated their concerns 
in light of the all-affected principle, but their concerns can be extended 
to all FMS.
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In the now-classic text “The Boundary Problem and Democratic 
Theory,” Whelan points out that an FMS “would require a different con-
stituency of voters or participants for every decision” (1983: 19). Dahl, 
similarly, voiced his worry that “for every different set of persons affected 
there be a different association or decision-making unit” and asked rhe-
torically: “[H]ow is the citizen who is affected by so many different units 
of government . . . to devote much time and energy to any of them?” (1970: 
64). In sum, the demos that an FMS creates is not only deterritorialized 
but indeterminate and shifting; it is more appropriate in this context 
to speak of overlapping demoi—with a different demos corresponding to 
each separate policy issue or legislative proposal.
Dahl, Whelan, and Song don’t go far enough in recognizing the 
extent to which this conception of democracy is unstable. Not only 
is the demos indeterminate when membership standards are func-
tional, but it is radically indeterminate—there is no way in advance to 
predict the precise composition of any particular (functionally de-
fined) demos. Of course, living in the territory of a particular polity 
with defined borders would expose oneself to more local policy fields 
than not living there, supposing that jurisdiction is still understood 
for the most part territorially. However, and a fortiori given the ev-
er-more interconnected economic and social world, few legislative pol-
icies that require coercive regulation can have their “coercive field” 
(the scope of persons that they potentially coerce) limited precisely 
to a particular territory. Thus, the demoi under this conception of de-
mocracy constitute an ever-changing set of deliberative forums with 
considerably overlapping jurisdictions whose compositions are unpre-
dictable. This implication, that the membership of demoi are radically 
 indeterminate—“floating”—has grave procedural implications far be-
yond Dahl’s concern with managing citizens’ time and energy.8 Or so I 
argue in the next subsection.
Whereas the tenacious membership problem demonstrates that FMS 
do not solve the boundary problem, the floating characteristic of the 
demoi that FMS create suggests that they may exacerbate it. The legiti-
macy concern that the boundary problem poses is elevated from a single 
problem at a historically defined moment (the constitution of the demo-
cratic polity) to a diffuse and recurring issue undermining the legitimacy 
of each and every decision. Every democratic decision would come cou-
pled with a need to define the demos for that decision and thus every such 
decision would create the putative “legitimacy gap” that the boundary 
problem identifies.
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The Indeterminacy of Subjection to Law under Floating Demoi
I next want to draw attention to a problem beyond the question of legiti-
mately determining which persons ought to be members of any particu-
lar demos. Let’s put that problem, fundamental though it is, to one side 
and say for the sake of argument that we have solved it technocratically 
(despite my objections in Part I). It still remains a fact under such a system 
that for every policy and rule one will be bound to and with a different set 
of individuals. This itself, in my view, renders democratic government 
impossible.
Imagine the practicalities of such a system. Even disregarding the 
enormous logistical task of matching every person to the network of 
rights and obligations that connect them to other persons based on the 
shared membership of floating demoi, the enforcement of rules must 
also be piecemeal. Remember that the exercise of political power over an 
individual is supposedly legitimated by some preferred democratic legiti-
macy procedure, which is implemented by a set of demoi corresponding 
roughly to the total number of rules and policies and not correspond-
ing in any determinate fashion to territorially defined jurisdictions. How 
would law enforcement look in such a system? Either enforcement or-
ganizations would enforce the rule only of a particular demos (i.e., each 
rule would require a specific enforcement organization), or enforcement 
organizations would enforce a different set of rules on each individual, 
corresponding to the rules and regulations that apply to them on the 
basis of which demoi they were a member of. In the first case (and not-
withstanding the costs of such an operation), there would be overlapping 
jurisdictions and a near-total abandonment of the principle of a monop-
oly of legitimate violence. In the second, the locus of legitimacy of the 
enforcement agency would be difficult to identify, and a relationship of 
democratic accountability would be impossible to maintain.
Correlating then to the radical indeterminacy of the constitution 
and membership of floating demoi, subjection to law under a system of 
floating demoi would also be indeterminate. One would not—could not—
know in advance with which persons one would be bound, and by which 
persons one could be legitimately coerced to follow which rules and pol-
icies. And not only would law-making bodies and procedures be unstable, 
but the legal jurisdictions that they generate would also be indetermi-
nate. This would have major implications in terms of the enforceability 
of rules and policies across overlapping and complex demoi.
Jurisdictions being indeterminate also poses direct problems for their 
legitimacy. A standard account of political legitimacy focuses on the le-
gitimate exercise of political power, where wielding political power is 
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understood as “attempt[s] to exercise a monopoly, within a jurisdiction, 
in the making, application, and enforcement of laws” (Buchanan 2002: 
689–690). But with overlapping and indeterminate jurisdictions, this el-
ement of the monopoly of power is impossible. Indeterminate jurisdic-
tions also present a problem with regard to the plausibility of citizens 
being able to identify which rules and regulations apply to them, and 
what their corresponding rights and obligations may be. Recall Dahl’s 
worry that citizens may not be able to devote much time and energy to 
the institutions that floating demoi give rise to. Once we focus on the in-
determinacy of jurisdictions and law enforcement, the problem becomes 
much more dramatic: under the floating demoi of FMS, jurisdictional 
questions will dominate the interactions between persons. Uncertainty 
about one’s own rights and obligations and the rights and obligations 
of others in one’s vicinity would disrupt ordinary patterns of legitimate 
expectation. Normal economic and civic relationships between persons 
are based on expectations that, to a large extent, we share many rights 
and obligations with the people we interact with. Under FMS with float-
ing demoi, such expectations would be impossible. Civic and economic 
interactions with an individual would be accompanied by the question of 
which demoi one shared with them and, correspondingly, which rights 
one held and which obligations one owed to that particular individual 
(that is, the extent to which one was in overlapping jurisdictions with 
that individual on any salient legal, policy, and/or regulatory issue).
It is already a significant legal fiction that it is possible for individuals 
to be aware of all the legal rights and obligations to which they are sub-
ject in a modern, stable jurisdiction, even with substantial legal training. 
Where the set of rights and obligations differs for every person, this prob-
lem becomes endemic. Each person would need to be a legal specialist 
in their own right in order to be able to identify even very roughly what 
they are legally permitted and obligated to do. Together, the myriad diffi-
culties related to the enforcement of democratic rules made in unstable 
jurisdictions and the legal uncertainty that citizens of such demoi would 
face can be labeled the floating demos objection.
A Global Democracy Solution?
One way to take the wind out of the sails of the objections I have made—
the tenacious membership objection in Part 1 and the floating demos 
objection in Part 2—could be with recourse to the idea of a “global 
demos.” The general strategy here would be to argue that, for one reason 
or another, a particular FMS ought best to be understood as including 
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all persons globally. A global demos would avoid the problems detailed 
above, as the question of membership could be settled definitively (all 
persons ought to be members of the global democratic body). It would 
also result in a stable demos with a stable jurisdiction and the possibility 
of one enforcement organization applying the law consistently to all.
This sort of move, however, does not come without costs—many the-
orists are skeptical about global democracy on a wide variety of grounds 
that are beyond the scope of this article (e.g., Christiano 2006; Dahl 1999; 
Miller 2010; Näsström 2007: 647; Nili 2017). On the other hand, there are 
also theorists who commend global (or “cosmopolitan”) democracy for 
reasons entirely independent of the global demos’s ability to “solve” the 
boundary problem (Archibugi 2008; Archibugi and Held 1995; Bohman 
2007; Goodhart 2008; MacDonald 2008; Marchetti 2011). Regardless, from 
the perspective of the legitimation of the constitution of the demos, 
the global demos seems to be a theoretically elegant solution for those 
who propose FMS. After showing the affinity of two important accounts 
for FMS—Goodin’s and Abizadeh’s—with global demos solutions to the 
boundary problem, and engaging Song’s objections to global democracy, 
this section lays out a critique of global democracy based on the impossi-
bility of democratic accountability in a global state.
From Functional Membership Standards to a Global Demos
Both Goodin and Abizadeh concede that their arguments for FMS (respec-
tively, on principles of all-affected interests and all-subject-to-coercion) 
result in an expansionary logic that cannot be stemmed before reach-
ing a fully global demos comprising all persons (Abizadeh 2008: 18–19; 
Goodin 2007: 65–66). The expansionary logic has several drives. First, for 
any specific decision a person may be directly affected or not, but some 
of those that are not directly affected would be affected had the decision 
gone the other way (Goodin 2007: 54). Second, though a specific person may 
not be “actually” affected by vote X, regardless of the outcome of the 
vote, they surely are affected by the decision-making procedure that re-
sulted in vote X being put on the agenda rather than possible vote Y (the 
results of which would affect them). Goodin concludes that his “expan-
sive conception of ‘all possibly affected interests’ causes the franchise to 
balloon dramatically and the scope for legitimate exclusions to shrink 
accordingly.” The result? That “virtually, (maybe literally) everyone in 
the world—and indeed everyone in all possible future worlds—should 
be entitled to vote on any proposal or any proposal for proposals” (2007: 
55). This move requires that one cast the FMS not as affecting “precisely 
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those people potentially coerced by the political question at hand” (or 
affected in the way deemed relevant by a different functional standard) 
but rather “at least all those people coerced [relevantly affected] by the 
political question at hand” (2007: 55). A system of worldwide democracy 
(with a global demos) would include at least every single person meeting 
any particular FMS while avoiding the flaws of floating demoi.
Initially, Abizadeh wants to propose a standard less inclusive than the 
principle Goodin discusses. He thinks that by appealing to all-subject-to-
coercion rather than a version of all-affected-interests, he is making a 
less-demanding claim: “Notice what my argument does not say. It does 
not say that all those who are affected by a political regime are owed 
democratic justification (and hence rights to democratic participation). 
My argument appeals to a more restricted principle” (2008: 45). Yet, Abi-
zadeh recognizes that the best way to theorize the unbounded demos is 
in terms of a global demos consisting of all (living) people.9 For instance, 
he writes that “[t]he unbounded demos thesis . . . claims that ‘the demos’ 
in PL [normative democratic theory’s principle of legitimation] is prop-
erly glossed as ‘all persons’” (2008: 45, fn. 27). Abizadeh further specifies 
the global implications of his view when he reflects on how a border 
regime granting participation rights to all those coerced by it may look 
institutionally:
To be democratically legitimate, any regime of border control must ei-
ther be jointly controlled by citizens and foreigners or, if it is to be under 
unilateral citizen control, its control must be delegated, through cosmo-
politan democratic institutions giving articulation to a “global demos,” 
to differentiated polities on the basis of arguments addressed to all. (Abi-
zadeh 2008: 54)10
The Global Demos, Democratic Procedures, 
and Democratic Legitimacy
The global demos seems to be a theoretically elegant solution to the 
boundary problem. It proposes that participation rights are granted to all 
persons everywhere—at least for those decisions that affect them (which, 
as discussed above, quickly expands to include all persons everywhere). 
But, is such a global democracy feasible? Is it normatively desirable? Is 
it logically possible? This section develops a critique on the feasibility 
of a global democracy on procedural terms, namely that it would not be 
realistically possible for citizens to hold a global democratic government 
to account, which, given the centrality of accountability to democracy, 
undermines the possibility of democratic government.
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One classic, liberal, response to a global state stems from the fear 
that centralizing all political power in one institution would lead to des-
potism (as the saying goes, “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely”). This is the position that Immanuel Kant takes:
The idea of international right presupposes the separate existence of 
many independent adjoining states. And such a situation is essentially 
a state of war, unless there is a federal union to prevent hostilities from 
breaking out. But in the light of the idea of reason, this state is still to 
be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single 
power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy. 
For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases 
its range, and a soulless despotism, after crushing the germs of good-
ness, will finally lapse into anarchy.
(Kant [1795] 1991: 113)
This liberal response seems, however, to rely on a pre-political standard of 
substantive goodness that politics ought to facilitate. If the final end of 
politics is fixed in this way, then the desirability of a particular system of 
government would turn on its securing that end. However, the concep-
tion of democracy I endorse is open-ended (I return to this point in the 
next section). A democratic legitimacy standard ought therefore not to be 
interrogated on substantive grounds, but rather on procedural grounds, 
if it is to be interrogated on its own terms.
Whatever else the merits or demerits of the global demos as an ideal, 
we must ask ourselves whether a global democracy can further demo-
cratic government, or whether, for procedural reasons, it brings us fur-
ther from that goal. I will argue that a global democracy would in fact be 
suspect on procedural grounds. I object to the legitimacy of a global de-
mocracy with a global demos based on the impossibility of such a polity 
being accountable to its citizens.11 If this line of argument is convincing, 
then the question of whether a global demos might solve the boundary 
problem is moot, or at least incidental.
Song has offered a criticism of proposals for a global demos that of-
fers an excellent starting point for our investigation. She argues that de-
mocracies must have three features: first, the protection of equal rights 
and liberties; second, guaranteeing that these rights have equal worth 
by providing “equal opportunities for political influence”; and third, a 
minimum solidarity between citizens (2012: 44). Song stipulates that a 
basic set of political rights are necessary for democratic government to be 
possible. These rights include negative rights such as freedom of political 
speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly, and the positive 
demand for equal suffrage (which Song calls simply the “right to vote”). 
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This is the minimal procedural core of democracy. As Song puts it, “polit-
ical equality is a constitutive condition of democracy; the realization of 
political equality depends on respecting certain equal basic liberties and 
ensuring equal opportunities for political influence” (2012: 47). Song goes 
on to challenge global conceptions of democracy on the grounds that 
they cannot secure sufficient solidarity among global citizens (the polity 
being too large and complex).12
Recourse to solidarity, however, makes Song’s argument fragile in 
a particular sense: solidarity is at best instrumentally necessary to democ-
racy, and, some may say, is just another political value between which 
democratic procedures must arbitrate, given incommensurable differ-
ences between people’s views of what is in fact valuable (i.e., value plu-
ralism). So, despite being sympathetic to her overall argument, I choose 
to sketch out a line of critique based on procedural aspects of democracy 
that are intrinsic to democratic government. I therefore proceed by fur-
ther developing an aspect of her first constitutive feature of democracy—
equal rights and liberties—as it offers fertile ground for a new procedural 
critique of global democracy.
At first blush, a procedural objection to global democracy grounded 
on the need for democracies to secure equal rights and liberties is not 
obvious. There is no theoretical reason to suppose that the negative free-
doms listed—freedom of speech, press, and assembly—could not, in prin-
ciple, be guaranteed by a global democracy (no matter how unlikely it is 
to achieve them). The same applies to equal suffrage. However, we ought 
to start by asking ourselves why freedom of speech, press, and assembly 
are constitutive freedoms in a democracy. The answer must lie at least in 
part in their being prerequisites for citizens to hold governments to account; 
to exchange and debate their views on governmental activities; and to 
form their judgment on how they wish to cast their votes on election day. 
It is therefore a prior demand that citizens must have adequate access to 
knowledge and information of government action to inform those demo-
cratic (electoral) accountability mechanisms that make sense of democra-
cy’s constitutive liberties as reported by Song and Dahl.13
Following the analytical definition of the core components of demo-
cratic accountability by Mark Philp (2009), I hold that three things are 
required for an agent to be held accountable; they must be required to 
inform, explain, and justify their decisions and commands. Putting aside 
the difficult question of precisely who is empowered to demand account-
ability from a political authority,14 and how they can do so, democratic 
accountability requires that “members of a collectivity . . . [are] able [to] 
ask for, receive, and accept (or reject) reasons and justifications for the 
exercise of powers” (Warren 2014: 41).
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Once we recognize the importance of adequate access to information 
about government activities, an accountability-based, procedural critique 
of global democracy starts to emerge. A global democratic government 
would clearly be less accountable on these terms than a national demo-
cratic government, and more likely to be oligarchic (Christiano 2006; 
Urbinati 2003). Indeed, Robert Keohane (2003: 130ff) points out that so-
phisticated accounts of global democracy recognize the impossibility of 
global democracy meeting this accountability standard through electoral 
politics and develop alternative accountability mechanisms to try to fill 
this gap. But only accountability mechanisms that afford each citizen of 
a global demos formally equal and adequate accountability mechanisms 
can meet the democratic norm that a polity treats each person as an 
equal source of authoritative value (the “equal value demand” that I de-
velop in the following section). Some may claim that a system of global 
accountability could be devised (gargantuan though the task appears) by 
targeting and streamlining information on the activities of the global gov-
ernment to those citizens concerned (Macdonald 2008; Marchetti 2008). 
The problem with this move is that such a system could not make any 
assumptions about which citizens are or are not likely to be “affected” 
or “coerced” by a particular decision or government action if it is not to 
falter under the critique I have made of FMP toward the end of Part 1. 
Determining which citizens are affected in the relevant ways would be a 
political decision that raises the same specter of the boundary problem 
that global democracy purported to solve. Only citizens themselves, by 
“voting with their votes,” if you will, can legitimately determine whether 
and how they consider their interests affected by government action.
Pluralist Democracy and NonIdeal Democratic Legitimacy
So far, we have considered FMPs and global democracy as two ways of 
addressing the boundary problem, which holds that whatever the theory 
of legitimacy that we believe our preferred democratic decision proce-
dure should meet, the initial act of constituting the demos can never be 
considered met by it. Yet we have seen how inadequate both solutions 
are. The first leads to floating demoi with radically indeterminate juris-
dictions that undermine the possibility of democratic government. The 
second undermines the possibility of a relationship of accountability be-
tween citizens and a global democracy. This leaves us with a dilemma: 
is there no way for democratic theory to resolve the boundary problem?
In this last section, I want to sketch out an account of democratic 
legitimacy that I call “pluralist democracy.” Pluralist democracy is not, 
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I claim, sensitive to the boundary problem. Therefore, if we accept plu-
ralist democracy, we need not embrace the convoluted proposals of ad-
vocates of FMS, nor embark on a futile quest for a global democracy—at 
least, not as means to solve the putative normative dilemma posed by the 
boundary problem. I do not provide a first-principles defense of pluralist 
democracy here but show how two common and plausible postulates of 
democratic theory should lead us to recognize democratic legitimacy as a 
historically grounded and non-ideal standard.
Pluralist democracy does not resolve the boundary problem: it is still 
the case that the pluralist standard of inclusion in a demos—subjection 
to law—cannot legitimate the constitution of the demos (Schaffer 2012). 
But pluralist democracy denies that this is a flaw. Democratic governance 
is justified not by its meeting an abstract, ahistorical ideal, but by ref-
erence to the illegitimacy of concrete, historically particular polities that 
democratic states replace. In that sense, democratic legitimacy is a com-
parative, not an ideal notion. So the boundary problem is a category mis-
take—there simply is no “initial act of constituting the demos”; demoi 
are made from existing polities and are justified comparatively. Relative to 
their nondemocratic predecessors, emerging democratic states include 
(more of) those subjected to the laws of the polity. They do so through for-
mally equal participatory rights (such as the right to vote and be elected), 
the exercise of which collectively determines how political power in that 
polity is to be used. In other words, democratic processes should be con-
sidered to legitimate real and existing political communities understood 
in a historical and contextual (though not necessarily ethnic or national) 
sense. Cicero makes a similar point in On the Commonwealth when he 
writes “the commonwealth is the concern of a people, but a people is not 
any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size 
associated with one another through agreement on law and community 
of interest” ([54 BCE] 1999: 18).
The argument is centered on the idea that the correct conception of 
legitimacy to be used in examining the democratic legitimacy of a polity 
is contextual and not universal. Whereas Abizadeh posits the core “ideal” 
understanding of the demos as “all persons” understood universally, 
pluralist democracy considers demoi to be contextually (pre)defined. 
Democracies do not arise from nothing; they are preceded by political 
institutions claiming relationships of authority over defined and determi-
nate subjects and a definite and determinate territory. These defined and 
determinate subjects are the populus, and in nondemocratic states their 
political equality is denied. The state institutions of law-making, adminis-
tration, adjudication, and coercion rule over the populus, not in its name 
(although many may claim to be doing so). These institutions democrats 
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judge to be illegitimate for not living up to the standards of democratic le-
gitimacy. This illegitimacy is the central premise in political agitation to 
democratic reform. Where successful (and often historically the success 
is piecemeal and gradual rather than comprehensive and immediate) the 
populus becomes the demos—a body of people united through their subjec-
tion to laws that they have an equal stake in creating.
I have chosen to name the conception of democracy outlined here 
“pluralist democracy” for two reasons. First, pluralist democracy will or-
dinarily result in a democratic polity characterized by competition be-
tween different political projects and ideologies (i.e., political pluralism). 
The second reason is the foundational thesis of the possibility of value 
pluralism. While a demand to treat persons as equal sources of value (the 
“equal value demand”) underlies pluralist democracy’s generally demo-
cratic conception of legitimate politics, the possibility of value pluralism 
demands majoritarian and iterative democratic procedures. Before fur-
ther exploring the equal value demand and the possibility of value plural-
ism, I want to briefly consider the question of how inclusive the body of 
citizens with suffrage is compared to all persons in the polity.
In ancient Athenian democracy, there were (roughly) four classes of 
persons: male citizens, female citizens, metics, and slaves. Citizens were 
those whose parents were Athenian. Metics lived in Athens but were not 
Athenian-born, and slaves were the property of citizens or of the city. 
Of these types, only male citizens, once they attained the age of major-
ity and had completed their military service, could vote or hold office. 
Many democratic theorists now consider the demand that all adult citi-
zens ought, in a democracy, to be able to vote and hold office central to 
democratic legitimacy. A polity according suffrage only to men would 
not, on this view, be democratic, properly speaking. Furthermore, many 
contemporary theorists hold that noncitizen residents (those whom Athe-
nians would classify as metics) should also be able to vote and hold office, 
and perhaps even that non-resident citizens should not be able to vote 
and hold office (López-Guerra 2014: 83–108). In contrast to the functional 
membership standards (such as all-those-affected and all-those coerced) 
discussed in Part 1 of this article, pluralist democracy demands that all 
those permanently subject to law ought to be included in the democratic 
process. This may exclude some nonresident citizens, and will include 
many noncitizen residents, much like the view defended by Claudio 
López-Guerra (2005).
Pluralist democracy argues for a (historically) highly inclusive 
demos—all those permanently subject to the law should be a mem-
ber. This follows from two plausible claims: the normative principle of 
persons as equal sources of political value, and the recognition of the 
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permanent possibility of pervasive and incommensurable value plural-
ism. While I do not offer a first-principles defense of the first, nor seek to 
prove empirically the second, I do hope to underline their normative and 
empirical plausibility.
It is perhaps helpful to first clarify the precise interrelation of the 
two foundational principles, since pluralist democracy considers them 
jointly necessary and individually insufficient for grounding democratic 
government. If only the possibility of value pluralism is correct, then we are 
left with no normatively salient reasons for prioritizing the majority view 
over others.15 If people are not to be treated as equal sources of authori-
tative value, then no person ought to feel bound to accept a view other 
than their own as authoritative and normatively binding. If, on the other 
hand, only the equal value claim holds (in other words, if there can be soci-
eties constituted by permanent value monism), then there is not always 
a reason to turn to competitive democratic procedures to decide what is 
to be done—members of a society characterized by stable value monism 
may widely agree on the political agenda.
The possibility of value pluralism is weakly empirical, as it concerns 
the actual, empirical possibility of value pluralism rather than the fact 
of value pluralism, either in any particular context or in all human so-
cial contexts. It is in that sense a thesis that has its foundations in the 
moral psychology of human nature, rather than being a sociological or 
anthropological claim. Moving from the fact to the possibility of value 
pluralism gives us democratic grounds for opposing the dissolution of 
the institutions and procedures of democratic government through 
structurally democratic procedures.16 There are other reasons to prefer an 
account grounded in the possibility rather than the “fact” of value plural-
ism. First, it allows us to avoid the arduous empirical task of determining 
whether and when the factual claim is actually true. Second, an account 
of democracy’s value grounded in the fact of value pluralism seems to 
be importantly contingent. If we are to imagine a society that lacks this 
sociological characteristic, then we lose our foundation for democratic 
government. Equally, in countries that are not (or are less) characterized 
by value pluralism, the pluralist democratic defense of democratic gov-
ernment would be weaker or may not hold at all.
Neither the claim of the possibility of value pluralism, nor the equal 
value demand are metaethical claims. While it seems evident to me that 
the metaphysics of ethical rules or norms must be either monist or plu-
ralist and cannot be both, I do not take a position on this question here. 
Neither do the possibility of value pluralism and the equal value demand 
make a thick claim about moral realism versus moral antirealism; plu-
ralist democracy can remain largely agnostic about both the question of 
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whether and how (any) ethical propositions are factually true and the 
question of whether value pluralism as an ethical stance is committed to 
moral realism or moral antirealism.
There is, however, one sense in which I cannot remain fully agnos-
tic. Pluralist democracy is committed to the foundational principle that 
persons are treated as equal sources of authoritative value (the equal 
value demand). A full-blown moral nihilist position (or thoroughgoing 
moral skepticism) would deny the force or attractiveness of foundational 
principles in general, including the equal value demand. Accepting the 
equal value demand must therefore imply opposing moral nihilism and 
its cognates. It does, however, permit agnosticism about the relative or 
absolute grounding of ethical propositions. It may be, as with Aristote-
lian first principles, that the equal value demand is foundational in the 
philosophical sense and cannot be “proven.” If that is so, then perhaps it 
can only be comprehended in a noninferential manner and consequently 
corroborated by our experience. Such a conclusion would be—controver-
sially—in line with G. A. Cohen’s (2003) views on the fact independence of 
final normative principles. Perhaps, in contrast, an intrinsic or relativistic 
defense of the equal value demand is more convincing (Christiano 2008; 
Invernizzi Accetti 2015). The challenge for such an account in light of 
pluralist democracy would be to mount this defense without reliance on 
a substantive conception of the good that would render it self-defeating.
It is important not to confuse the equal value demand with what 
might be called an “equal value claim.” The idea is not that, objectively, 
different and contrasting (perhaps incommensurable) views regarding 
value held by individuals have equal value. This would be an ethically 
ambitious and probably nonsensical idea (outside of moral antirealism, 
which holds that contrasting values have an equal moral value of nil; 
see Joyce 2015). The equal value demand is much less ambitious. It holds 
that, politically, no one in a political community ought to be treated as a 
superior source of authoritative value. That is not to say that everyone’s 
judgment over what is valuable must be respected, strictly speaking, since 
this would generate veto rights for every person and, consequently, that 
organized minorities can hold an unequal weight in political procedures. 
Respecting persons as equal sources of political value means no more and 
no less than ensuring that all have an equal stake in the political process.
Joseph Schumpeter, for example, has argued that if a particular so-
ciety is, for instance, highly religious, then they should be able to ex-
clude nonmembers of their religion from their democratic community 
([1942] 2013: 244–245). It seems that such a society is not characterized 
by pervasive and incommensurable value pluralism. However, pluralist 
democracy insists on the empirical premise that, even in such a society, 
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the possibility exists of value pluralism in the future, and for that reason 
all those permanently subject must be included in the demos. This idea is 
prefaced on democratic processes being iterative.
The demand that democratic processes are iterative stems from the 
equal value demand and the possibility of value pluralism. Imagine that 
in society A, at time T1, 90 percent are members of religious congregation 
Y and a vast majority of those believe that only members of their con-
gregation ought to participate in the democratic processes. Schumpeter 
would argue for the legitimacy of this move, invoking (implicitly) the 
democratic character of this exclusion by the majority. Pluralist democ-
racy, however, insists that the minority (the 10 percent at T1) may become 
the majority at T2—or that in any case the majority at T1 may, in the future, 
lose their status as majority at T2 (such changes in the cultural makeup of 
a territory’s population are common, historically). If congregation Y had 
been able to define the demos in their image at T1, this would result in 
minority rule at T2. Notice, I am not saying that the disenfranchisement 
of the 10 percent portion of the demos at T1 would “not be democratic.” 
It would be a democratic decision in one important sense, namely that 
it would meet the descriptive condition of being a decision taken by the 
vast majority of electors or their representatives. It would not, however, 
be a democratically legitimate decision, if we accept pluralist democracy’s 
two foundational claims—the equal value demand and the possibility of 
value pluralism.
There remains a question about democratic legitimacy and demo-
cratic inclusion, concerning the extent of how to judge putative demo-
cratic polities that imperfectly include all those permanently subject to 
the law. For instance, was Switzerland democratically legitimate before 
women were awarded the federal franchise by a majority (66 percent) of 
(only male) citizens in a referendum on February 7th 1971? This is a diffi-
cult question to answer. Denying it seems to deny the legitimacy of that 
vote. Pluralist democracy here shows its historically grounded and non-
ideal character; decisions that improve the inclusivity of a demos toward 
the inclusion of all those subjected to the law will be taken to constitute 
advances in terms of the legitimate and democratic character of a polity.
Conclusion
It is important to be clear as to the precise nature of my claim and its 
consequences: I do not claim that there are no pressing questions of po-
litical membership; the political independence of an ex-colony such as 
New Caledonia from France is an example of such a question, as is the 
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question of the status of Northern Ireland in Great Britain, the salience 
of claims for West Papuan independence from Indonesia, and Catalan in-
dependence from Spain, to name but four that are live in current affairs. 
The claim, rather, is that abstract and universally framed considerations 
of “perfect” democratic communities with perfectly justified member-
ships have no purchase on such real-world issues, which must thus be 
settled by reference to other norms and values. In short, my view is that 
there is no boundary problem (or that it is not a problem of practical 
import), but there are many normative issues pertaining to boundary-set-
ting, for instance in the context of immigration and secession. Therefore, 
pace Abizadeh, proposals for immigration regimes, for instance, cannot 
be justified via recourse to the supposed boundary-problem-solving qual-
ity of proposed arrangements.
The key is to recognize that democratic legitimacy is a non-ideal po-
litical value that must be contextualized (placed into a context) for it 
to have meaning. The question “is the demos legitimately constituted 
in this preferred theory of democratic legitimacy?” therefore has little 
value. Liberal democracy, far from being an ideal arrangement in uni-
versal terms (assuming, as ideal theory tends to, that persons act in full 
compliance with their obligations and in circumstances of perfect knowl-
edge), is necessary, normatively, for non-ideal reasons (the possibility of 
value conflict grounded in value pluralism). The best justifications for 
democratic government are grounded in the intransigent and often in-
commensurable political conflict and disagreement between persons 
over how to handle unavoidably common affairs. To adapt a famous line 
from James Madison, if people were angels, no democratic government 
would be necessary.
Once understood in this historical, contextualized sense, the legiti-
macy of the constitution of the demos can be asked in relation to a neces-
sarily determinate group of people exercising a particular form of collective 
control over coercive power. Indeed, pressure for reforming an existing 
autocratic regime follows a similar structure. There is not nor has there 
ever been a “state of nature,” in which free and politically independent in-
dividuals have the possibility of contracting to form an ideally conceived 
political association. Rather, calls for democratic reform are always made 
on the basis of the putative illegitimacy of an existing regime that claims 
authoritative status without democratic institutions. What legitimizes 
the democratization of a polity (or the spread of the franchise in a polity) 
is that its constituent members were already a collective, bound under 
coercive regimes that did not afford them a voice.
Of course, the above account is a simplification, not least because 
democratic franchise has not generally, in history, been awarded to all 
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adult citizens at once, but rather been extended slowly, along the lines of 
sex, class, and property. Nevertheless, I think that when asking, for exam-
ple, if the extension of the franchise from men to women was legitimate 
on democratic grounds, it would be absurd to say it was not, as women 
had no vote in the matter. Rather, the resulting constitution of the demos 
ought to be contrasted with what preceded it on the relevant democratic 
grounds (the extent to which all those subject to law are included in the 
demos).
This position has an interesting consequence. Take the United King-
dom’s 1918 Representation of the People Act,17 which extended suffrage 
to men and women without an education or property qualification. In 
the context of early-twentieth-century political history, the Act was a 
major democratic reform. In contrast with what preceded it, it extended 
the franchise to many more subjected to UK law, removed economic and 
class-based barriers, and is recognized by pluralist democracy as a break-
through in the United Kingdom’s democratic suffrage.18 Nevertheless, if a 
similar measure would be taken now, it would be shockingly illegitimate 
on the self-same grounds, since the Act limited the franchise to women 
over 30, while for men the limit was 21; given the current rule in the 
United Kingdom granting suffrage in general (parliamentary) elections to 
men and women equally from the age of 18, this would constitute a major 
regression from the pluralist democratic standard that all those subjected 
to the law of a polity should have an equal stake in its authorization.
If legitimacy is understood in the way I have described, much of 
the sting is taken out of the boundary problem. The point that I have 
conceded—that the (initial or enlarged) constitution of a demos cannot 
be legitimated on the ordinary grounds by which the democratic legiti-
macy of the political order is subsequently tested—no longer seems so 
problematic. The legitimacy of the constitution of an existing polity is 
driven by a demand for more representative government by a people al-
ready “bounded” both corporately and territorially. The legitimacy of fur-
ther democratic reforms is considered in this context. Do reforms extend 
democratic rights among those subject to the legal and political order?
While this does not solve all—or even most—of the justificatory ques-
tions pertinent to the accession to and secession from existing demo-
cratic polities (of both individuals and groups), such a non-ideal approach 
does allow us to theorize the democratic legitimacy of existing states in 
circumstances of normal politics. It also sets as a non-ideal standard a 
conception of democratic legitimacy that enables rather than disables 
the democratic government of particular, bounded polities, in stark con-
trast to radically indeterminate polities with functional membership 
standards or a global “democratic” state.
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	 NoteS
 1. In this article, I use the term demos to mean those persons in a democratic 
polity that have the right to vote. In that sense, I use it interchangeably with 
the term “electorate” and “democratic body.” In this sense, my usage departs 
from Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi’s more technical require-
ment of the demos needing “the capacity to be organized democratically in 
such a way as to function as a state-like group agent” (2010: 110).
 2. I borrow the term “functional” from Song (2012: 56).
 3. By immanent critique, I mean a critique that draws its normative standards 
from the practice that is subjected to critical attention. Antii Kauppinen 
gives a clear exposition of this approach—which he labels “simple internal 
critique”—free of tradition-specific jargon (2002: 483–484). For recent exam-
ples of the application of this argumentative strategy, see, for example, Nico-
laïdis (2013) or Theuns (2017).
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 4. Of course, theorists can also have independent reasons for endorsing global 
democratic institutions and procedures (e.g., Archibugi 2008; Archibugi and 
Held 1995; Bohman 2007; Goodhart 2008; MacDonald 2008; Marchetti 2011).
 5. Goodin (2007) himself is not very optimistic about the specificity of this func-
tional standard in the end; he concludes that these modality issues have the 
effect extending the franchise to all people in all democratic procedures on 
all issues.
 6. Interestingly, Abizadeh does not consider that all persons should have an 
equal say in his unbounded demos. Some people better meet the functional 
criteria than others (some are more coerced than others by certain policies). 
The latter ought, Abizadeh supposes, to have greater say in the matter than 
those in the first category. I do not engage this view extensively, but note that 
my floating demos objection has even greater purchase once we give up on “one 
person, one vote.”
 7. Whelan draws attention to a related problem when he claims that the prob-
lem of regression I describe here leads to a logical inconsistency: “[B]efore a 
democratic decision could be made on a particular issue (by those affected), a 
prior decision would have to be made, in each case, as to who is affected and 
therefore entitled to vote on the substantive issue . . . And how is this deci-
sion, which will be determinative of the ensuing substantive decision, to be 
made? It too should presumably be made democratically —that is, by those 
affected—but . . . [this] is a logical as well as a procedural impossibility” (1983: 
19). Whelan is wrong, however, that it is self-evident that the decision over 
who is affected must logically be made by a democratic procedure. The real 
problem, rather, is that determining who is affected in a purely technocratic 
apolitical fashion is not realistic. The standards used in such an exercise will 
undoubtedly be contested, and such contestations will often result from in-
commensurable differences of opinion over what constitutes the appropri-
ate metric for judging the appropriateness of competing standards. In other 
words, these decisions will necessarily be highly political, as Johan Karlsson 
Schaffer (2012) has pointed out, and must therefore be settled democratically.
 8. As I have made clear, the floating demos feature has been noted by others 
(e.g., Dahl 1970; Song 2012; Whelan 1983). However, the point that the con-
stitution of these floating demoi cannot be plausibly known in advance of 
a procedure has not yet been made, to my knowledge. The impossibility of 
foreknowledge of the constitution of demoi raises its own problems, which 
are arguably the most important problems theoretically. To my knowledge, 
no one has as yet pointed out how floating demoi exacerbate the boundary 
problem.
 9. Goodin in fact goes even further, claiming that the expansionary tendencies 
of this reasoning ought to include all persons current and future persons 
and, as noted above, all persons in all possible worlds.
10. Indeed, we may speculate that this is the reason that he opted for the label 
“unbounded demos” as opposed to using the plural “unbounded demoi” in 
the article.
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11. Many of those who defend versions of global democracy recognize the im-
portance of democratic accountability (e.g., Archibugi 2008; Macdonald 2008; 
Marchetti 2008), so this critique, if convincing, is also important. However, I 
do not intend the objections here to apply to weaker versions of cosmopol-
itan democracy that merely seek to strengthen the democratic character of 
international institutions and laws in line with Held’s suggestion that cos-
mopolitan democracy “does not call for a diminution per se of state power” 
but that insist on the need “to entrench and develop political institutions at 
regional and global level as necessary complements to those at the level of the 
state” (2003: 478, emphasis added).
12. Song also criticizes “episodic” conceptions of democracy for being unsta-
ble along the lines of my critique of functional membership standards. 
She asks: “What would political equality among members of episodic, con-
stantly changing demoi look like?” before arguing that “it is hard enough 
to forge solidarity in support of greater equalization of resources within 
states” and “would be nearly impossible” (2012: 56–57) under what I have 
called “floating demoi.” As I detail in Part 2, my critique goes beyond 
Song’s in drawing attention to the “radical indeterminacy” of the floating 
demoi; here I complement her solidaristic argument—which is vulnera-
ble in that it draws on a substantive value—with an argument focused on 
accountability.
13. Song recognizes the importance of access to information but focuses on the 
difficulty of voters voting “in an informed way” (2012: 57). My critique focuses 
not on this epistemic aspect but on the essential role of information in hold-
ing governments to account in democracies.
14. In other words, the question of “the agent or institution to whom or to which 
they [the accountable agent] give an account” (Philp 2009: 32).
15. This is not to say that the democratic legitimacy of majoritarian decision-
making is total—as I outline below, pluralist democracy rejects the demo-
cratic legitimacy of majoritarian attempts to impose restrictions on the 
franchise that exclude those subject to the law. Other majoritarian decisions 
that undermine the possibility of democratic government are also suspect, 
though, for reasons of space, I do not enumerate them here.
16. Since, for instance, a majority commitment to undermine a democratic in-
stitution or procedure in light of an absence of value conflict in a certain 
governance area is suspect given the possibility of a (future) return of value 
pluralism in that area.
17. See https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1918/64/pdfs/ukpga_19180064_en.pdf.
18. This is not to say that such moments of breakthrough should not be criticized 
on other grounds. Not a single woman voted for the 1918 Representation of 
the People Act. To use American author and journalist Ida Husted Harper’s 
words (used in the context of ballot initiatives for women’s suffrage), this 
meant “simply that the men of the State . . . [had] the absolute right to say 
whether women may have the suffrage, a doctrine contrary to justice, equity, 
democracy, and common sense” (1914: 717).
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